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1 Introduction
We study perfect information games where each player is active only once. Our emphasis is
on the question of existence of subgame perfect –equilibria. The references below testify to
the increasing attention that the concept has been receiving in the recent game–theoretic
literature. In addition to the challenging existence issue, the paper reaches out to a large
arena of research on topics such as minority games, time–inconsistent preferences, and
intergenerational games.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. The first contribution is to introduce a
class of so–called frequency–based minority games. These are perfect information games
where each player becomes active exactly once in the course of the game and has a choice
between two actions. One is a safe action: taking this action leads to an intermediate
payoff irrespective of what the other players do. The other is a risky action: it gives a high
payoff if a minority of the players use it, and a low payoff otherwise. The subtlety of the
construction lies in the exact meaning of the expression “a minority of the players”. We
allow for several specifications, the most characteristic of which invokes the frequency of
the appearance of the risky action in the population. Our main result on frequency–based
minority games states that these games admit no subgame perfect –equilibria for small
positive .
To motivate our construction, we consider two examples introduced in Peleg (1969) and
Voorneveld (2010) that were used to highlight equilibrium existence issues in normal-form
games with infinitely many players. We adapt them to our setting and turn them into
perfect information games where each player is active only once. Under this formulation,
they are very similar in spirit to frequency–based minority games. Nevertheless, we show
that these examples do admit subgame perfect –equilibrium, underlining the subtlety of
the definition of a frequency–based minority game.
Closely related to our work are two known counter–examples to existence of subgame
perfect –equilibrium. One is a stopping game played by a sequence of players considered in
Flesch, Kuipers, Mashiah–Yaakovi, Schoenmakers, Solan, and Vrieze (2010). The example
shows that games of the type studied in this paper need not admit subgame perfect –
equilibria in pure strategies. The other example is given in Flesch, Kuipers, Mashiah–
Yaakovi, Shmaya, Schoenmakers, Solan, and Vrieze (2014). Being a game with two players,
this example falls outside the class of games considered here. The authors show that
the game admits no subgame perfect –equilibrium, whether in pure or mixed strategies.
Frequency–based minority games thus demonstrate that even in games where each player
only acts once, the existence of subgame perfect –equilibrium is not guaranteed.
Our second contribution is providing several conditions for existence of subgame perfect
–equilibrium. Many of these conditions have previously appeared in the literature in
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various contexts. We discuss each condition in turn.
[I] Games with qualitative objectives: These are games where each players’ payoff
function takes only two values, 0 or 1. This class is motivated by a vast computer sci-
ence literature on qualitative games. The inventory of qualitative objectives considered in
computer science includes reachability, safety, Bu¨chi, parity, and Mu¨ller objectives. We
show that games with qualitative objectives admit subgame perfect 0–equilibria in pure
strategies. The proof is based on an iterative procedure from Flesch et al (2010).
[II] Games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. We show that games of this class admit
a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements the findings
of Purves and Sudderth (2011), who consider games with finitely many players.
[III] Games continuous outside a countable set. These are games in which the payoffs
are continuous when restricted to a sufficiently large part of the domain. This some-
what technical condition is related to the work of Flesch and Predtetchinski (2016b). We
show that this class of games admits a subgame perfect –equilibrium, for every positive
value of . The result generalizes the corresponding result of Cingiz, Flesch, Herings, and
Predtetchinski (2016).
[IV] Games played by a finite number of teams. A team is a group of players with
identical payoff functions. In this class of games the set of players can be partitioned
into finitely many teams. The idea of teams consisting of individual players has attracted
considerable attention (see e.g. von Stengel and Koller (1997), Solan (2000), Gossner and
Tomala (2007), von Stengel and Zamir (2010), Gossner and Ho¨rner (2010)). We show that
games of this class admit a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies.
Games where each player acts only once arise naturally in economics. One example is
decision making with time–inconsistent preferences, as modeled by a sequence of multiple
selves (Strotz (1956), Pollak (1968), Peleg and Yaari (1973)). A special case of this is
hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak (1968), Laibson (1994, 1997), Jas´kiewicz and
Nowak (2014)). Another example is intergenerational games, where a player in the infinite
sequence of players represents an entire generation (Phelps and Polak (1968), Balbus,
Jaskiewicz, Nowak (2015)). In each period, a player decides upon the amount of savings,
which affects available income in the next period. In a similar vein, Asheim (2010) considers
a model with an infinite stream of generations to analyze intergenerational social welfare.
A class of continuous games games played by a sequence of players is studied for example
in Hellwig, Leininger, Reny, and Robson (1990). Callander and Ho¨rner (2009) study social
learning using games played by a sequence of players.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the general model and formal
definitions. In Section 3, we study the two examples as adapted from Peleg (1969) and
Voorneveld (2010). In Section 4 we introduce frequency–based minority games and show
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that they admit no subgame perfect –equilibria for small positive values of . In Section
5 we give several sufficient conditions for the existence of subgame perfect –equilibrium.
2 The model
Preliminaries: Let N denote the set of natural numbers {1, 2, . . .}. Let A be a non–empty
finite set. For every t ∈ N, let Ht denote the set of sequences of elements of A of length t−1.
Thus, in particular, H1 is a singleton consisting of the empty sequence ø. Let H = ∪t∈NHt.
Elements of H are called histories. Let AN denote the set of infinite sequences of elements
of A. Elements of AN are called plays. A typical play is written as p = (a1, a2, . . .). Finite
sequences ø, (a1), (a1, a2), . . . are said to be prefixes of the play (a1, a2, . . .). A play p is said
to extend a history h ∈ H if h is a prefix of p. In a similar vein, we define the prefix of a
history and a history extending another history.
Given a history h ∈ H, we define the cylinder set C(h) as the set of plays p ∈ AN such
that h is a prefix of p. The collection of all cylinder sets is the basis of a topology on AN.
In what follows, AN is always assumed to be endowed with the topology generated by the
cylinder sets. This topology is equal to the product topology, where each A is given the
discrete topology, and is well-known to be a Polish topology.
We let B denote the Borel sigma–algebra on AN, the smallest sigma–algebra containing
all the open sets. Since A is assumed to be finite, B coincides with the sigma–algebra
generated by the cylinder sets.
The game: We consider games where the set of players is equal to N. Player t ∈ N is
active in exactly one period, period t. In period t, player t chooses an action at from the
set A. The chosen action is observed by all players. Depending on the infinite sequence of
actions chosen p = (a1, a2, . . .), player t receives a payoff equal to ut(p). Throughout the
paper we assume that, for every player t, ut takes only finitely many values and is Borel
measurable on AN.
Let some player t ∈ N be given. A strategy σt for player t is a mapping σt : Ht → ∆(A).
Recall that Ht is defined as the set of histories of length t − 1, so Ht corresponds to the
set of histories where player t is active. The set ∆(A) contains all probability measures on
A. A strategy profile is denoted by σ = (σt)t∈N. The set of strategies for player t ∈ N is
denoted by Σt and the set of strategy profiles by Σ = t∈NΣt.
A strategy σt for player t ∈ N is called pure if for every h ∈ Ht, σt(h) places all the
probability on a single action. The set of pure strategies for player t is denoted by St. A
pure strategy st ∈ St is treated as a function st : Ht → A. The set of pure strategy profiles
is denoted by S = t∈NSt.
We define ρ : S × H → AN by letting ρ(s|h) denote the play induced by the pure
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strategy profile s conditional on reaching history h. Formally, for every t ∈ N, for every
h ∈ Ht, we let ρ(s|h) be the play (h, at, at+1, . . .) where at = st(h), at+1 = st+1(h, at), and
so on. The payoff for a player t ∈ N induced by a pure strategy profile s ∈ S at h ∈ Ht is
denoted by vt(s|h) = ut(ρ(s|h)).
Given a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ and a history h ∈ H, we let µσ,h denote the Borel
probability measure on AN induced by σ in the subgame starting with history h. Thus,
µσ,h places probability 1 on the cylinder set C(h). The expected payoff for a player t ∈ N,
induced by σ at h, is equal to
vt(σ|h) = Eµσ,h(ut) =
∫
AN
utdµσ,h. (2.1)
We denote vt(σ|ø) by vt(σ). This brings us to the following definitions.
Definition 2.1 For  ≥ 0, a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is an -equilibrium if for every player
t ∈ N, for every strategy σ′t ∈ Σt,
vt(σ) ≥ vt(σ−t, σ′t)− .
Mertens and Neyman (see Mertens (1987)) have shown that, for any game satisfying
our assumptions, a pure strategy 0–equilibrium exists.1
A strategy profile that constitutes an -equilibrium for a game does not necessarily
induce an -equilibrium in every subgame, even though that would be highly desirable for
a solution concept. This is the main motivation for considering the following refinement of
-equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 For  ≥ 0, a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a subgame perfect -equilibrium if
for every history h ∈ H, for every player t ∈ N, for every strategy σ′t ∈ Σt,
vt(σ|h) ≥ vt(σ−t, σ′t|h)− .
Thus a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a subgame perfect –equilibrium if and only if, for every
h ∈ H, σ induces an –equilibrium in the subgame starting with history h if and only if
for every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht, for every at ∈ A,
vt(σ|h) ≥ vt(σ−t, at|h)− . (2.2)
The main emphasis of the paper is to study the existence of subgame perfect -
equilibrium in the class of games satisfying our assumptions.
1The argument is spelled out for games with finitely many players. It is clear that it remains valid in
the present setting where the number of players is infinite.
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3 Perfect information minority games
In this and the next section we discuss three particular games in detail. These three games
share the following feature: each player chooses one out of two actions and the action that
is chosen by a minority of the players yields the better payoff. The precise meaning of
minority is what distinguishes the three games from each other.
Minority games with simultaneous moves have been considered in Peleg (1969) and
Voorneveld (2010). Both authors present minority games that do not admit a 0–equilibrium.
Moreover, Radner (1980) has shown that Peleg’s game does not admit an –equilibrium
for arbitrarily small positive values of .
In this section we will revisit the minority games of Peleg (1969) and Voorneveld (2010),
but within a setup with sequential moves and perfect information. Perfect information
versions of both minority games have a 0–equilibrium in pure strategies, a fact that follows
from the general result by Mertens and Neyman alluded to above.
Our focus is primarily on subgame perfect –equilibria. We show that the perfect
information version of the minority game as presented in Voorneveld (2010) has a subgame
perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies and that the perfect information version of the
minority game as presented in Peleg (1969) has a subgame perfect –equilibrium for every
positive value of .
We start with the perfect information version of the minority game as presented in
Voorneveld (2010).
3.1 Perfect information version of Voorneveld (2010)
Consider the action set A = {0, 1}. For every T ∈ N, we define the function fT : AN → [0, 1]
by
fT (a1, a2, . . .) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
at, (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN. (3.1)
Moreover, we define the function f : AN → [0, 1] by
f(a1, a2, . . .) = lim sup
T→∞
fT (a1, a2, . . .), (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN.
The number f(a1, a2, . . .) measures the frequency of action 1 in the sequence (a1, a2, . . .).
The function f is Borel–measurable.
Example 3.1 Perfect information version of Voorneveld (2010).
The action set is equal to A = {0, 1}. For every t ∈ N, player t’s payoff function is given
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by
ut(a1, a2, . . .) =

1, if at = 1 and f(a1, a2, . . .) ≤ 1/2,
1, if at = 0 and f(a1, a2, . . .) > 1/2,
0, otherwise.
Player t receives a payoff of 1 if he chooses the minority action. Otherwise player t receives
a payoff of 0. More precisely, player t receives a payoff of 1 if he chooses action 1 and the
frequency of players choosing action 1 is less than or equal to 1/2. Player t also receives a
payoff of 1 if he chooses action 0 and the frequency of players choosing action 1 is strictly
above 1/2.
Consider the game of Example 3.1. The pure strategy profile sV = (sVt )t∈N ∈ S is
defined by
sV1 (ø) = 1,
sVt (a1, a2, . . . , at−1) = at−1, t ∈ N \ {1}, (a1, a2, . . . , at−1) ∈ Ht.
According to sV, player 1 chooses action 1 and subsequent players choose the same action
as their predecessor. On the induced path, every player chooses action 1. The next result
establishes that sV is a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies.
Claim 3.2 The strategy profile sV is a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies of
the game in Example 3.1.
Proof: Take an arbitrary player t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. If player t chooses any action
at at history h and the other players follow s
V
−t, the induced play becomes
ρ(sV−t, at|h) = (h, at, at, at, . . .),
and hence
vt(s
V
−t, at|h) = 0.
In view of (2.2), the pure strategy profile sV is a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium indeed. 
Example 3.1 is an example of a game with qualitative objectives considered in more
detail in Section 5. There we argue that all such games admit a pure strategy subgame
perfect 0–equilibrium.
We now turn to our second example, the perfect information version of the minority
game as presented in Peleg (1969).
6
3.2 Perfect information version of Peleg (1969)
Example 3.3 Perfect information version of Peleg (1969).
The action set is equal to A = {0, 1}. Let E be the set of plays such that only finitely
many players take action 0, so
E = {(a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN | {t ∈ N : at = 0} is finite}. (3.2)
For every t ∈ N, player t’s payoff function is given by:2
ut(a1, a2, . . .) =

1, if at = 1,
2, if at = 0 and (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ E,
0, if at = 0 and (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN \ E.
Player t has the option to take the safe action 1 and receive a payoff of 1 irrespective of the
actions chosen by the other players. Player t can also take the risky action 0 and receive
a payoff of 2 when only finitely many other players choose action 0. Otherwise, the payoff
when taking the risky action is equal to 0.
As noted earlier, the result of Mertens and Neyman implies that the game of Exam-
ple 3.3 has a 0–equilibrium. One particular 0–equilibrium of the game is as follows: all
players take action 1 as long as no player has chosen action 0. As soon as some player
takes action 0, all subsequent players take action 0 as well. This 0–equilibrium is not sub-
game perfect. At a history such that some player has chosen action 0, the 0–equilibrium
prescribes to take action 0 leading to a payoff of 0. Switching to action 1 gives a payoff of
1 and is therefore a profitable deviation. We show next that the game of Example 3.3 does
not have a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium.
Claim 3.4 The game of Example 3.3 has no subgame perfect 0–equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that the game has a subgame perfect 0-equilibrium, say γ ∈ Σ. Let
Ec be the complement of E, so Ec denotes the set of plays (a1, a2, . . .) for which the set
{t ∈ N : at = 0} is infinite. We proceed by considering two cases.
Case 1: For every h ∈ H, µγ,h(Ec) = 0.
Consider a player t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. We have vt(γ|h, 1) = 1 and vt(γ|h, 0) = 2.
Since γ is a subgame perfect 0-equilibrium, γt(h) puts probability 1 on action 0. Since this
is true for every player and every history, we obtain a contradiction to the assumption of
case 1.
2To make the transition to the game studied in Section 4 more natural, we have added one to the
payoffs in Peleg (1969) and have relabeled action 0 as action 1 and action 1 as action 0. Clearly, this is
inconsequential for the analysis of the example.
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Case 2: For some h′ ∈ H, µγ,h′(Ec) > 0.
By Le´vy’s zero-one law,3 there exists a history h ∈ H extending h′ such that
µγ,h(E
c) > 1/2. (3.3)
For every k ∈ N, let hk = (h, 1k−1, 0) be the history where after history h first k−1 players
take action 1 and next the last player takes action 0. For every k ∈ N, we define Fk = C(hk),
the set of plays extending history hk, so the set of plays where it takes exactly k periods
after history h to observe action 0. We define the singleton set of plays F∞ = {(h, 1, 1, . . .)}.
Observe that {F1, F2, . . . , F∞} is a partition of C(h). We argue that
µγ,h(E
c ∩ Fk) ≤ 12µγ,h(Fk), k = 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (3.4)
Intuitively, with respect to the measure µγ,h, less than or equal to half of the plays in Fk
are such that the action 0 is taken infinitely many times.
Take some k ∈ N. If µγ,h(Fk) = 0 then also µγ,h(Ec ∩ Fk) = 0 and inequality (3.4)
holds. Let us therefore consider the case µγ,h(Fk) > 0. Since Fk is equal to the cylinder
set C(hk), we have
µγ,h(E
c ∩ Fk) = µγ,hk(Ec) · µγ,h(Fk). (3.5)
Let t be the player who is active at history gk = (h, 1k−1). Then player t chooses action 0
with positive probability at gk. Since γ is a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium, it follows that
vt(γ|gk, 0) ≥ vt(γ|gk, 1) = 1. It holds that
vt(γ|gk, 0) = vt(γ|hk) = µγ,hk(Ec) · 0 + (1− µγ,hk(Ec)) · 2,
so we obtain µγ,hk(E
c) ≤ 1/2. Using equality (3.5), inequality (3.4) follows.
The set Ec is disjoint from F∞, hence µγ,h(Ec ∩ F∞) = 0, so inequality (3.4) holds.
Finally, since {F1, F2, . . . , F∞} is a partition of C(h), we have
µγ,h(E
c) = µγ,h(E
c ∩ C(h)) =
∞∑
k=1
µγ,h(E
c ∩ Fk) ≤ 12 ·
∞∑
k=1
µγ,h(Fk) ≤ 12 ,
obtaining a contradiction to (3.3). 
Consider the game of Example 3.3 and let some  ∈ (0, 1) be given. We define the
strategy profile σP, ∈ Σ by specifying, for every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht,
σP,t (h)(1) = 1− ,
σP,t (h)(0) = .
3For a formal statement of Le´vy’s zero-one law, see Appendix A.
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Under strategy σP,t , player t puts probability  on action 0, irrespective of the prevailing
history. The strategy σP,t is therefore stationary. We show next that σ
P, = (σP,t )t∈N is a
subgame perfect –equilibrium in the game of Example 3.3.
Claim 3.5 Let some  ∈ (0, 1) be given. The strategy profile σP, is a subgame perfect
–equilibrium in the game of Example 3.3.
Proof: Take some player t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. Under σP,, the probability that
infinitely many players play action 0 after history (h, 0) is equal to 1. It follows that
vt(σ
P,
−t , 0|h) = 0. Since vt(σP,−t , 1|h) = 1, we have
vt(σ
P,|h) =  · 0 + (1− ) · 1 = 1− .
Thus condition (2.2) holds for every at ∈ {0, 1}. We conclude that σP, is a subgame perfect
–equilibrium in the game of Example 3.3. 
Example 3.3 falls within the class of games continuous outside a countable set, as defined
below in Section 5. We argue that all such games admit a subgame perfect –equilibrium
for each positive .
We remark that minority games have been studied in a variety of very different contexts.
For an extensive list of related work we refer to Renault, Scarlatti, and Scarsini (2008) and
Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala (2007).
4 Frequency–based minority games
In the preceding section we have discussed two examples of minority games and shown that
both games have a subgame perfect –equilibrium for every  > 0. This section is devoted
to a class of frequency–based minority games that, unlike the two examples of the previous
section, do not have a subgame perfect –equilibrium for small positive .
This section is divided into three subsections.
4.1 The definition
Before we give a definition of the class of frequency–based minority games, we start with
an example. Recall the definition of the function fT in (3.1).
Example 4.1 Consider a game where the action set is given by A = {0, 1}. For each
t ∈ N, player t’s payoff function is given by
ut(a1, a2, . . .) =

1, if at = 1,
2, if at = 0 and (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ F,
0, if at = 0 and (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN \ F,
(4.1)
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where
F = {(a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN : lim sup
T→∞
fT (a1, a2, . . .) >
1
2
}. (4.2)
Action 1 is a safe action that leads to a payoff of 1 irrespective of the actions chosen
by the other players. Action 0 is a risky action. It leads to a payoff of 2 if the play of the
game belongs to the set F and to a payoff of 0 otherwise, so the risky action pays off if
it is chosen by a minority of the players. The set F expresses the condition that only a
minority of the players use action 0. More precisely, F consists of the plays such that the
limsup frequency of action 1 exceeds 1/2.
Thus the main difference between Examples 4.1 and 3.1 is that in 4.1 the two actions
are not symmetric. The main difference to Example 3.3 lies in the difference between the
sets F and E, a point to which we come back in the next subsection.
As follows from our main result, the game in Example 4.1 has no subgame perfect
–equilibrium for any  sufficiently small. Rather than proving this result specifically for
the game of Example 4.1, we identify a whole class of games where the same result applies.
These are the so–called frequency–based minority games.
We say that a set F ⊂ AN is admissible if
[F1] F is a Borel subset of AN.
[F2] F is a tail set in the following sense: if (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ F and (a′1, a′2, . . .) ∈ AN is such
that a′n 6= an for at most finitely many n ∈ N, then (a′1, a′2, . . .) ∈ F .
[F3] F is closed under ≤: if (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ F and (a′1, a′2, . . .) ∈ AN is such that, for every
t ∈ N, at ≤ a′t, then (a′1, a′2, . . .) ∈ F .
[F4] Let β1, β2, . . . be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in {0, 1}. There
exists ν∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that if each βt is equal to 1 with probability ν∗, then
P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F ) = 1.
[F5] Let β′1, β
′
2, . . . be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in {0, 1}. There
exists ν∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that if each β′t is equal to 1 with probability ν∗, then
P((β′1, β′2, . . .) ∈ F ) = 0.
Definition 4.2 A game as in Section 2 is a frequency–based minority game if A = {0, 1},
and for each t ∈ N, player t’s payoff function is given by equation (4.1), where the set F
is an admissible set.
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The set F describes the plays being such that action 0 is played by a minority of the
players. Condition [F1] is a technical measurability condition. By Condition [F2], whether
a play belongs to F or not depends only on the tail of the play. Condition [F3] expresses
that if some play belongs to F and the set of players choosing action 1 is a subset of
the set of players choosing action 1 at another play, then the other play belongs to F as
well. By Condition [F4] it holds that if all players choose action 1 independently with
sufficiently high probability, then the play belongs to F with probability 1. Similarly, by
Condition [F5], if all players choose action 1 independently with sufficiently low probability,
then the play belongs to F with probability 0.
4.2 Further examples of admissible sets
The set F in (4.2) is an example of an admissible set. In particular it satisfies condition
[F4] with for instance ν∗ = 2/3 and condition [F5] with ν∗ = 1/3 as a consequence of the
law of large numbers. The choice of 1/2 as a lower bound on the frequency of action 1
in (4.2) is inessential. Any number in the open interval (0, 1) yields an admissible set.
Likewise the set
{(a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN : lim inf
T→∞
fT (a1, a2, . . .) >
1
2
}
is admissible. A somewhat less obvious example of an admissible set is the following one:
{(a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN : `(f1(a1, a2, . . .), f2(a1, a2, . . .), . . .) > 12},
where ` is a medial limit, a special type of Banach limit, as described in Mertens, Sorin and
Zamir (2015, page 29). This medial limit ` is a positive linear functional that assigns a real
number to every bounded sequence of real numbers, and has various appealing properties.
For example, for every (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN it holds that
• `(a1, a2, . . .) = `(f1(a1, a2, . . .), f2(a1, a2, . . .), . . .)
• `(a1, a2, a3, . . .) = `(a2, a3, . . .),
• lim infT→∞ fT (a1, a2, . . .) ≤ `(a1, a2, . . .) ≤ lim supT→∞ fT (a1, a2, . . .).
It is easy to use examples of admissible sets to create new examples, since the collection
of admissible sets is closed under finite unions and finite intersections.
It follows from the topological zero–one law (Kechris [1995], Theorem 8.47) that an
admissible set is either meagre or comeagre. The Hewitt–Savage zero–one law (Shiryaev
[1996], p. 382) implies that if F is admissible, and β1, β2, . . . is an i.i.d. sequence of
Bernoulli random variables, then the probability P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F ) is either 0 or 1.
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Next we remark that any admissible set is sandwiched between the sets E and E ′,
where E is given by (3.2) and
E ′ = {(a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN | {t ∈ N : at = 1} is infinite}.
Claim 4.3 If F is an admissible set, then E ⊂ F ⊂ E ′.
Proof: The set F is non-empty by [F4]. By [F3] it must contain the play (1, 1, . . .). It now
follows by [F2] that it contains all plays in E.
Suppose that F is not a subset of E ′. Then F contains a play (a1, a2, . . .) such that only
finitely many players choose action 1. Replacing the finitely many 1’s by 0’s and making
use of [F2], we conclude that F contains the play (0, 0, . . .). But then, by [F3], we have
F = AN, contradicting [F5]. 
The sets E and E ′ are not admissible. More precisely, the set E satisfies [F1], [F2],
[F3] and [F5], but not [F4]. Indeed, if β1, β2, . . . is a sequence of i.i.d. distributed random
variables, each taking value 1 with probability ν > 0, then with probability 1 the realization
of infinitely many random variables βt is equal to 0. When taking F equal to E in the
game of Example 4.1, we obtain the game of Example 3.3. It follows from Claim 3.5 that,
for every  > 0, this game admits a subgame perfect –equilibrium.
The set E ′ is not admissible either. Indeed E ′ satisfies [F1], [F2], [F3] [F4], but not [F5].
Consider the game G′ obtained by taking F to be equal to E ′ in Example 4.1. The resulting
game has subgame perfect –equilibrium in which each player plays 1 with probability .
4.3 The main result
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4 Let G be a frequency–based minority game. Then G has no subgame perfect
–equilibrium whenever  < min{ν∗, (1− ν∗)/3}.
The proof of 4.4 makes use of a technique known in probability theory as coupling.
Before we embark on the proof of the theorem in its full generality, we discuss one
special case of the result, the non–existence of a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure
strategies. This consequence of Theorem 4.4 can be proved in an elementary way.
Claim 4.5 Let G be a frequency–based minority game. Then G has no subgame perfect
0–equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: Suppose s ∈ S is a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies of G. We
argue first that, for every h ∈ H, ρ(s|h) ∈ F.
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Take some player t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. Denote the play ρ(s|h) by p =
(h, at, at+1, . . .).
Suppose that p is not in F, so by Claim 4.3 it holds that p /∈ E. Then there is a player
t′ ≥ t and a prefix g = (h, at, . . . , at′−1) of p in Ht′ such that at′ = st′(g) = 0. Since
p ∈ AN \ F, it holds that vt′(s|g) = ut′(p) = 0. But this contradicts the fact that s is a
subgame perfect 0–equilibrium, since playing action 1 yields a payoff of 1. Consequently,
it holds that p ∈ F .
We have shown that, for every player t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, it holds that
ρ(s|h) ∈ F. It follows that, for every player t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, player t can
get a payoff of 2 by taking action 0, so st(h) = 0. It follows that ρ(s|ø) = (0, 0, . . .). Since
(0, 0, . . .) /∈ E ′, it holds by Claim 4.3 that (0, 0, . . .) /∈ F, so we have obtained a contradic-
tion to ρ(s|ø) = (0, 0, . . .) ∈ F. 
The intuition behind Claim 4.5 is as follows. It is argued first that after each history,
the subgame perfect 0–equilibrium play is such that a minority plays the risky action 0.
Otherwise, playing action 0 would lead to a payoff of 0 and every player would prefer to
choose action 1, leading to a contradiction. But if the subgame perfect 0–equilibrium play
is such that a minority plays action 0, then every player prefers to choose action 0, leading
to a contradiction with the fact that a minority plays action 0.
4.4 The proof of Theorem 4.4
To prove the main result, we adopt the following notational convention. Given a player
t ∈ N, a history h ∈ Ht, and a strategy profile σ, we use σt(h) to denote the probability that
σt(h) places on action 1. The probability that the resulting play belongs to F is denoted
by τ(σ|h), so
τ(σ|h) = µσ,h(F ).
Our main tool to prove Theorem 4.4 is the technique of coupling from probability
theory. It is used whenever the distributions of two distinct random variables defined on
different probability spaces need to be compared to each other. The technique of coupling
consists of creating a new, larger probability space, and two new random variables, having
the same distributions as the two original ones.
To illustrate the technique, consider Step 1 of the proof. It asserts that if at each
history the active player chooses action 1 with probability at least ν∗, then the resulting
play belongs to the set F with probability 1. Intuitively, such a strategy profile generates
at least the same number of 1’s as a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables each
13
taking value 1 with probability ν∗. The reverse statement is made for a strategy profile
such that at each history the active player chooses action 1 with probability at most ν∗.
Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy profile such that σt(h) ≥ ν∗ for every t ∈ N and for every
h ∈ Ht. In the proof of Step 1 we construct two sequences of random variables, β1, β2, . . .
and α1, α2, . . . , defined on a single state space. The first sequence is as in condition [F4].
The second sequence induces the same conditional probabilities on actions as the strategy
profile σ and satisfies αt ≥ βt for every t ∈ N.
Let G be a frequency–based minority game with the set F . Let ν∗ be as in [F4] and ν∗
as in [F5].
Step 1: Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy profile. If, for every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht, σt(h) ≥ ν∗,
then τ(σ|ø) = 1. If σt(h) ≤ ν∗ for every t ∈ N and every h ∈ Ht, then τ(σ|ø) = 0.
Proof of Step 1: We prove the first statement. The proof of the second statement is
similar.
We first construct a probability space (Ω,S,P) and, for every t ∈ N, random variables
αt : Ω→ {0, 1} and βt : Ω→ {0, 1} satisfying the following three properties.
1. β1, β2, . . . are i.i.d. with P(βt = 1) = ν∗.
2. For every (a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ Ht,
P(αt = 1|α1 = a1, . . . , αt−1 = at−1) = σt(a1, . . . , at−1).
3. αt ≥ βt.
We define the set B = {0, 1}. Consider a game where the action set is equal to A × B =
{0, 1} × {0, 1}. We define the strategy profile λ : t∈N(A× B)t−1 → ∆(A× B) as follows.
For every player t ∈ N, for every history (a1, b1, . . . , at−1, bt−1) ∈ (A × B)t−1, for every
action (at, bt) ∈ A × B, the value of λt(a1, b1, . . . , at−1, bt−1)(at, bt) is given in Table 1,
where h = (a1, . . . , at−1).
bt = 0 bt = 1
at = 0 1− σt(h) 0
at = 1 σt(h)− ν∗ ν∗
Table 1: The value of λt(a1, b1, . . . , at−1, bt−1)(at, bt).
Let Ω be the set (A × B)N, S the sigma–algebra of Borel sets of Ω, and P the prob-
ability measure µλ,ø. For every t ∈ N, let αt and βt be the random variables defined by
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αt(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = at and βt(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = bt. It is easy to check that αt and βt
have the three desired properties.
The sequence (α1, α2, . . .) induces the probability measure µσ,ø on the set of plays A
N.
It follows that
1 = P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F ) ≤ P((α1, α2, . . .) ∈ F ) = µσ,ø(F ) = τ(σ|ø),
where the first equality follows from [F4] and the inequality from [F3]. 
Now choose an  > 0 such that  < ν∗ and 1− 3 > ν∗ and suppose σ ∈ Σ is a subgame
perfect –equilibrium of G.
Step 2: For every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht such that τ(σ|h) < , it holds that σt(h) ≥ 1−3.
Proof of Step 2: Let some t ∈ N and some h ∈ Ht be given. It holds that
τ(σ|h) = σt(h) · τ(σ|h, 1) + (1− σt(h)) · τ(σ|h, 0)
or, equivalently,
(1− σt(h)) · τ(σ|h, 0) = τ(σ|h)− σt(h) · τ(σ|h, 1). (4.3)
Now player t’s expected payoff at history h is
vt(σ|h) = σt(h) + 2 · (1− σt(h)) · τ(σ|h, 0). (4.4)
Plugging equation (4.3) into equation (4.4), we get
vt(σ|h) = σt(h) + 2 · (τ(σ|h)− σt(h) · τ(σ|h, 1)).
Since playing action 1 yields a payoff of 1 and since σ is a subgame perfect -equilibrium,
we have vt(σ|h) ≥ 1− . It follows that
1−  ≤ vt(σ|h) = σt(h) + 2 · (τ(σ|h)− σt(h) · τ(σ|h, 1)) ≤ σt(h) + 2 · τ(σ|h).
This implies the statement of Step 2. 
Step 3: Defining random variables α1, α2, . . . and β1, β2, . . . .
We construct a probability space (Ω,S,P) and, for every t ∈ N, random variables
αt : Ω→ {0, 1} and βt : Ω→ {0, 1} satisfying the following three properties.
1. β1, β2, . . . are i.i.d. with P(βt = 1) = 1− 3.
2. For every (a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ Ht,
P(αt = 1|α1 = a1, . . . , αt−1 = at−1) = σt(a1, . . . , at−1).
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3. For every (a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ Ht, if τ(σ|a1, . . . , at−1) <  then αt ≥ βt.
We define the set B = {0, 1}. Consider a game where the action set is equal to
A×B = {0, 1}× {0, 1}. We define the strategy profile λ : t∈N(A×B)t−1 → ∆(A×B) as
follows. For every player t ∈ N, for every history (a1, b1, . . . , at−1, bt−1) ∈ (A × B)t−1, for
every action (at, bt) ∈ A×B, the value of λt(a1, b1, . . . , at−1, bt−1)(at, bt) is given in Table 2,
where h = (a1, . . . , at−1).
τ(σ|h) ≥ 
bt = 0 bt = 1
at = 0 3 · (1− σt(h)) (1− 3) · (1− σt(h))
at = 1 3 · σt(h) (1− 3) · σt(h)
τ(σ|h) < 
bt = 0 bt = 1
at = 0 1− σt(h) 0
at = 1 σt(h)− (1− 3) 1− 3
Table 2: The value of λt(a1, b1, . . . , at−1, bt−1)(at, bt).
Notice that the probability that (at, bt) = (1, 0) when τ(σ|h) <  is equal to σt(h) −
(1− 3), which is non–negative by Step 2.
Let Ω be the set (A × B)N, S the sigma–algebra of Borel sets of Ω, and P the prob-
ability measure µλ,ø. For every t ∈ N, let αt and βt be the random variables defined by
αt(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = at and βt(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = bt. It is easy to check that αt and βt
have the three desired properties. This completes the definition of the sequences.
Property 1, the fact that 1− 3 > ν∗, and Step 1 imply that
P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F ) = 1. (4.5)
Furthermore, the sequence (α1, α2, . . .) induces the probability measure µσ,ø on the set of
plays AN. It follows that
P((α1, α2, . . .) ∈ F ) = µσ,ø(F ) = τ(σ|ø). 
Step 4: τ(σ|ø) = 1.
Proof of Step 4: For every t ∈ N, define the random variable ψt : Ω→ {0, 1} by letting
ψt(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = 1 if τ(σ|a1, . . . , at−1) <  and ψt(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = 0 otherwise.
Define the random variable ψ : Ω → A by ψ(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = 1 if (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ F c and
ψ(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . .) = 0 if (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ F .
We argue that ψt converges P–almost surely to ψ. To see this, let 1F : AN → {0, 1} be
the indicator function of the set F and let C be the set of plays (a1, a2, . . . ) ∈ AN such
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that τ(σ|a1, . . . , at) converges to 1F (a1, a2, . . . ) as t approaches infinity. Applying Le´vy’s
zero–one law to the set F , we conclude that µσ,ø(C) = 1.
4 Now we have
P(ψt → ψ) ≥ P((α1, α2, . . . ) ∈ C) = µσ,ø(C) = 1,
where the first equality follows because the sequence (α1, α2, . . .) induces the probability
measure µσ,ø on A
N.
Combining these facts we obtain the following chain of equalities and inequalities:
P((α1, α2, . . .) ∈ F c)
= P(ψ = 1) (4.6)
= P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F and ψ = 1) (4.7)
= P(∃m ∈ N s.t. (β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F and ψm = ψm+1 = · · · = 1) (4.8)
≤ P(∃m ∈ N s.t. (α1, α2, . . .) ∈ F and ψm = ψm+1 = · · · = 1) (4.9)
= P((α1, α2, . . .) ∈ F and ψ = 1) (4.10)
= P(ψ = 0 and ψ = 1) (4.11)
= 0,
where (4.6) holds by definition of ψ, (4.7) is true because of (4.5), and equation (4.8)
is true because ψt converges P–almost surely to ψ. To prove inequality (4.9), suppose
that (β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F and ψm = ψm+1 = · · · = 1. By construction, we have that βt ≤
αt whenever ψt = 1. Since F is closed under ≤ by [F3] we conclude that the vector
(β1, . . . , βm−1, αm, αm+1, . . .) is in F . Now using the tail property [F2] we can replace
the finite prefix (β1, . . . , βm−1) by (α1, . . . , αm−1) and conclude that (α1, α2, . . .) is in F .
Inequality (4.9) follows.
Finally (4.10) holds because ψt converges P–almost surely to ψ and (4.11) holds by
definition of ψ. 
Step 5: For every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht, τ(σ|h) = 1.
Proof of Step 5: Let some t ∈ N and some h ∈ Ht be given. We define
F ′ = {(a1, a2, . . . , ) ∈ AN : (h, a1, a2, . . . , ) ∈ F}.
It is not difficult to show that F ′ is an admissible set. In particular, it holds that
P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F ) = P((β1, β2, . . .) ∈ F ′) for any sequence (β1, β2, . . .) of i.i.d Bernoulli
random variables. This implies that F ′ satisfies [F4] and [F5] as we can take ν∗′ = ν∗ and
ν ′∗ = ν∗.
Let G′ be the frequency–based minority game corresponding to F ′. Define the strategy
profile σ′ ∈ Σ by letting σt′(h′) = σt+t′−1(h, h′) for every t′ ∈ N and h′ ∈ Ht′ . Then σ′ is a
4See Appendix A for a precise statement of Le´vy’s zero–one law.
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subgame perfect –equilibrium of G′. Hence Step 4 implies that µσ′,ø(F ′) = 0. The result
of Step 5 now follows since µσ,h(F ) = µσ′,ø(F
′). 
Step 6: The game G has no subgame perfect –equilibrium.
Proof of Step 6: Let some t ∈ N and some h ∈ Ht be given. Since τ(σ|h, 0) = 1 by
Step 5, action 0 yields player t a payoff of 2 and action 1 a payoff of 1. It follows that
σt(h) ≤  < ν∗. By Step 1 we have τ(σ|ø) = 0, yielding a contradiction to the statement of
Step 4. 
5 Sufficient conditions for existence
For games with finitely many players, a number of sufficient conditions for the existence
of subgame perfect –equilibrium have been identified, see for instance Kuipers, Flesch,
Schoenmakers and Vrieze (2016), Flesch and Predtetchinski (2016a, 2016b). Much less is
known about games with infinitely many players.
Below we discuss four classes of games that admit a subgame perfect –equilibrium:
games with qualitative objectives, games with upper semicontinuous payoffs, games con-
tinuous outside a countable set, and games played by a finite number of teams. Many of the
conditions that we discuss have previously appeared in the literature in various contexts.
Example 3.1 falls into the class of games with qualitative objectives and Example 3.3 into
the class of games continuous outside a countable set.
Throughout Section 5, we fix a game G satisfying the assumptions made in Section 2.
5.1 Games with qualitative objectives
The game G is said to have qualitative objectives if for each player t ∈ N the payoff
function ut takes at most two values, 0 and 1. The game of Example 3.1 is a game
with qualitative payoffs. The literature on computer science provides many examples of
qualitative objectives: the reachability objective, the safety objective, Bu¨chi, parity, and
Mu¨ller criteria are all examples of qualitative objectives, see the review by Chatterjee and
Henzinger (2012). For t ∈ N, we let Wt denote the set of plays p ∈ AN for which ut(p) = 1.
We think of Wt as a winning set of player t.
Theorem 5.1 If the game G has qualitative objectives, then it has a subgame perfect 0–
equilibrium in pure strategies.
We apply the iterative algorithm developed in Flesch et al (2010) to prove Theorem 5.1.
For each ordinal number ξ, we recursively define the collection {Pξ(h) : h ∈ H} of sets of
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plays and the collection {αξ(h) : h ∈ H} of real numbers augmented with +∞. For ordinal
number 0, for every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, we define
P0(h) = {p ∈ AN : h is a prefix of p}, (5.1)
α0(h) = min
p∈P0(h)
ut(p). (5.2)
For every successor ordinal ξ + 1, for every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht, we let
αξ+1(h) = max
a∈A
min
p∈Pξ(h,a)
ut(p), (5.3)
Pξ+1(h) = {p ∈
⋃
a∈A
Pξ(h, a) : ut(p) ≥ αξ+1(h)}, (5.4)
with the convention that the minimum over the empty set is equal to +∞. For every limit
ordinal ξ, for every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, we let
Pξ(h) =
⋂
λ<ξ
Pλ(h),
αξ(h) = min
p∈Pξ(h)
ut(p).
One can show, exactly as in Flesch et al (2010), that for each h ∈ H the sequence Pξ(h)
is non–increasing by inclusion and that the sequence αξ(h) is non–decreasing. Moreover,
the game admits a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if the sets
Pξ(h) are non–empty for every ordinal ξ and every history h. Furthermore, the set ∩ξPξ(ø)
is exactly the set of plays that could be induced by subgame perfect 0–equilibria of the
game.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: We show that Pξ(h) is a non–empty set for each history h by
induction on ξ. The statement is clearly true for ξ = 0. Suppose the statement is true for
the ordinal ξ. Consider a history h ∈ Ht and let a be an action that reaches the maximum
in (5.3). Then Pξ+1(h) ⊃ Pξ(h, a), hence Pξ+1(h) is non–empty, as desired.
We now turn to the more challenging case of a limit ordinal ξ. Suppose that Pη(h) is
non–empty for each h ∈ H and each ordinal η < ξ. Let h ∈ Ht be given. We recursively
define a play p = (h, at, at+1, . . . ). To define at we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: If αη(h) = 0 for each η < ξ, let at be any element of A.
Case 2: Otherwise, let η < ξ be the least successor ordinal such that αη(h) = 1. Let
at ∈ A be an action that reaches the maximum in (5.3) with ξ + 1 = η. Notice that
Pη(h, at) ⊂ Wι(h).
To proceed with the definition of p let ht+1 = (h, at) and repeat the argument ad in-
finitum. The construction guarantees that p ∈ Pξ(h). 
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Gra¨del and Ummels (2008) consider games with qualitative objectives in a setup that is
complementary to ours: there are finitely many players and each player can move infinitely
many times. The authors show that the games of this class admit a subgame perfect 0–
equilibrium. Unlike Gra¨del and Ummels who rely on Borel determinacy (Martin (1975))
to obtain their result, our technique does not require that the winning sets Wt be Borel
measurable.
5.2 Games with upper semicontinuous payoffs
The payoff function ut of player t ∈ N is upper semicontinuous if for every sequence (pn)n∈N
of plays in AN that converges to a limit p ∈ AN it holds that lim supn→∞ ut(pn) ≤ ut(p).
Equivalently, ut is upper semicontinuous if for each real number r ∈ R the set {p ∈ AN :
ut(p) ≥ r} is closed. The game G is said to have upper semicontinuous payoffs if every
player t ∈ N has upper semicontinuous payoffs.
Theorem 5.2 If the game G has upper semicontinuous payoffs, then it admits a subgame
perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: We argue that the set Pξ(h) as defined in the previous subsection is a non–empty
compact set for each history h and each ordinal ξ. The proof is by induction on ξ. For
ξ = 0 the statement is clearly true. Assume that for some ordinal number ξ the statement
is true. Take h ∈ Ht, and let a ∈ A be an action that attains the maximum in (5.3). Since
Pξ+1(h) ⊃ Pξ(h, a), the set Pξ+1(h) is non–empty. Since, for every a ∈ A, the set Pξ(h, a) is
compact by assumption and since A is finite, the set ∪a∈APξ(h, a) is also compact. The set
{p ∈ AN : ut(p) ≥ αξ+1(h)} is compact because ut is upper semicontinuous. We conclude
that Pξ+1(h) is compact.
Let ξ be a limit ordinal and the statement is true for each λ < ξ. Then the statement
is true for ξ because the intersection of a nested family of non–empty and compact sets is
non–empty and compact. 
This result complements the result in Purves and Sudderth (2011), which shows that
perfect information games with a finite number of players and upper semicontinuous payoff
functions with finite range admit a subgame perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies. Their
method of proof relies on induction on the number of payoffs in the game and therefore
seems difficult to extend for games with infinitely many players.
A related work is Le Roux and Pauly (2014), which considers games with bounded upper
semicontinuous payoffs but do not assume that the payoff functions only take finitely many
payoffs. The authors show that the game admits a 0–equilibrium in pure strategies.
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An interesting open problem is existence of subgame perfect –equilibria in games with
lower semicontinuous payoffs. Due to an example in Flesch et al (2010) we do know that
such games do not always admit a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium.
5.3 Games continuous outside a countable set
A subset C of AN is said to be co–countable if the set AN \ C is a countable. The game
G is said to be continuous outside a countable set5 if there exists a co–countable subset C
of AN such that for each player t ∈ N the restriction of the payoff function ut to the set
C, denoted ut|C, is a continuous function. The game of Example 3.3 is continuous outside
a countable set. Let C = AN \ E and note that the set E is countable. For every player
t ∈ N, the function ut|C only depends on at and is hence continuous. The game G is said
to have uniformly bounded payoff functions if there exists B < ∞ such that, for every
t ∈ N, for every p ∈ AN, |ut(p)| < B.
Theorem 5.3 If the game G has uniformly bounded payoff functions and is continuous
outside a countable set, then it admits a subgame perfect –equilibrium for each  > 0.
Proof: Take a positive δ so small that 2BMδ <  where M is the cardinality of the action
set A. For each player t consider a restricted strategy space Σδt consisting of strategies σt
such that for each h ∈ Ht the probability distribution σt(h) places a probability of at least
δ on each action in A. Now let Σδ be the corresponding set of strategy profiles. It is clear
that for each σ in Σδ the induced probability measure µσ,h places probability zero on each
singleton set {p}, and consequently also on each countable subset of AN. In particular µσ,h
assigns probability 0 to the complement of the set C. Consequently the payoff function
vi(σ|h) is continuous on Σδ. A standard fixed point argument could now be invoked to
prove the existence of a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium of the game with restricted strategy
spaces. Any such strategy profile is a subgame perfect –equilibrium of the original game. 
Theorem 5.3 generalizes a result in Cingiz et al (2016) who consider so-called centipede
games played by a sequence of players.
5.4 Games played by a finite number of teams
A team is a group of players with identical payoff functions. The game G is said to be
played by a finite number of teams if there exists a finite partition {T1, . . . , Tn} of the
player set N such that ut = ut′ whenever t, t′ ∈ Tk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The idea
5The condition that a game is continuous outside a countable set is weaker than the condition used in
Flesch and Predtetchinski (2016b).
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of teams consisting of individual players is not new, see for instance the references in the
introduction.
Theorem 5.4 If the game G is played by a finite number of teams, then it has a subgame
perfect 0–equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: Consider a game where the set of players is {1, . . . , n}, player k’s payoff function
is ut for t ∈ Tk, and player k makes a move at each period t ∈ Tk. This results in a game
with finitely many players. Flesch et al (2010) now applies to find a strategy profile that is
immune to one shot deviations, i.e. a strategy profile with the property that no player can
improve his payoff at any history by deviating only once. Such a strategy profile induces
a subgame perfect 0–equilibrium of the game G. 
Appendix A: Le´vy’s zero-one law
A general statement of Le´vy’s zero-one law can be found in e.g. Bogachev (2007), Example
10.3.15. Here we state a version that is sufficient for our purposes. Consider a Borel subset
P of AN and let 1P : A
N → {0, 1} denote the indicator function of P, that is 1P (p) = 1 if
p ∈ P and 1P (p) = 0 if p ∈ AN \ P . Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy profile. For t ∈ N, we define
τt : A
N → [0, 1] by
τt(a1, a2, . . .) = µσ,(a1,...,at)(P ), (a1, a2, . . .) ∈ AN
as the probability that the play belongs to P conditional on a history of length t.
Theorem 5.5 Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy profile and h ∈ H be a history. Then the sequence
τ1, τ2, . . . converges to 1P µσ,h–almost surely.
According to Theorem 5.5, the probability measure µσ,h assigns probability 1 to the set
of plays p for which τt(p) converges to 1P (p).
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